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Abstract:   
Favoritism is the act of offering jobs, contracts and resources to members of one’s social 
group in preference to outsiders. Favoritism is widely practiced and this motivates an 
exploration of its origins and economic consequences. 
 
Our main finding is that individuals have an interest to trade favors over time and that 
this will come at the expense of others, who are outside their group. We show that 
favoritism is relatively easier to sustain in smaller groups. Favoritism entails social costs 
as it usually leads to inefficient allocations. However, favoritism can lead to payoff 
advantages for larger groups. Productivity enhancing investments are larger in groups 
which practice favoritism. The availability of investment opportunities can reinforce 
payoff inequalities across groups. 
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1 Introduction
Favoritism refers to the action of offering jobs, contracts and resources to members of one’s
own social group to the detriment of others outside the group. Favoritism appears to be widely
practiced. On the death of Omar Bongo, Gabon’s president, we read:
The suggestion of fiddling public finances flummoxed and infuriated him. Corrup-
tion, he once explained to a reporter, was not an African word. No more was
nepotism: he simply looked after his family, supplying them with villas in Nice as
well as the ministries of defence and foreign affairs. (The Economist, 2009).
In a closely related vein, Chua’s (2003) work highlights the prominence of ethnic minorities
in a range of developing countries across the world. She proposes within-group favoritism
and crony capitalism (which refer to ties between political elite and ethnic minorities) as an
important element in the success of the ethnic minorities. Similarly, Pande (2003), presents
evidence from India on how politicians direct public resources towards their own caste group.1
There is also evidence on the practice of favoritism in developed economies. Alumni of
top graduate schools and universities have long been suspected of practicing unfair favoritism
towards their members; for a recent empirical study in the French context, see Kramarz and
Thesmar (2009). Similarly, Scoppa (2009) provides strong evidence for the role of favoritism in
the Italian public sector. Empirical work over the past half century highlights the widespread
use of social contacts in labor markets: summarizing the empirical evidence, Ioannides and
Loury (2004) report that between thirty and sixty percent of jobs in developed economies are
obtained via social connections: there clearly exists the potential for the practice of favoritism.2
Popular accounts highlight the exchange of favors as a key mechanism underlying fa-
voritism: Mr. A does Mr. B a favor today and in turn Mr. B does a favor to Mr. C
tomorrow, who in turn does Mr. A a favor sometime in the future. The aim of this paper
is to identify the circumstances under which this trading in favors is possible and then study
its economic consequences. We lay out the key elements of our model and describe our main
findings now.
Profitable economic opportunities – production, investment and consumption – arise over
time. To realize the gains from an opportunity, individuals must meet and transact: an
1See Franck and Rainier (2009) for a recent study finding strong evidence of ethnic favoritism in Africa.
2For an interesting study on favoritism in the financial sector see Charumilind, Kali and Wiwatankantang
(2006).
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investor needs a lender, a procurer needs a supplier, and an employer needs an employee. For
simplicity, from now on, we will refer to the two individuals as the employer and employee.
Some individuals – the experts – are better at a task as compared to others. The problem
of matching employer and expert is straightforward: the employer hires an expert and this
maximizes social welfare.
Now let us consider this matching process over time: an economic opportunity specifies
an efficient/ideal match between some employer Mr. A and some expert Mr. X. If Mr. A
offers the job to a non-expert Mr. B, the output is smaller; there is a cost to employing a
non-expert. So Mr. A will only employ Mr. B if he is compensated for this loss in some form.
A possible compensation would be for Mr. B to promise to offer a job to Mr. A in the future.
Now, Mr. A compares the current cost of employing Mr. B with the potential gains from
being employed himself in the future (in spite of being a non-expert). Offering non-expert Mr.
B the job is a favor which is returned by Mr. B at some point in the future. This trading of
favors may include other individuals, such as Mr. C and Mr. D, who offer ‘favors’ to Mr. A
in return for favors that Mr. A offered to Mr. B in the past.
Our first observation is that in a market where everyone abides by the rule of employing
the expert, there exist incentives for friends to start a club of mutual favors. This motivates
a closer examination of the circumstances in which favoritism can arise in equilibrium of a
repeated game. We show favoritism can be sustained within a group if players are patient
enough and if non-experts are not too inefficient. Moreover, favoritism is easier to sustain in
smaller groups (Proposition 2). Favoritism is sustained by the greater future employment, i.e.,
employment possibilities in the state when someone is a non-expert. However, the probability
of being hired declines as group size grows because there are many more non-experts in the
group at any point in time.3
We then turn to the consequences of favoritism. We observe that aggregate welfare de-
creases unambiguously in the extent of favoritism present in society and that welfare losses
are highest when the two groups have equal sizes. This is because favoritism is practised in
effect when employers and experts lie in different groups, and these situations occur most
frequently when groups have equal sizes.4
Group sizes also shape economic inequality. When everyone abides by market rules mem-
bership of a group confers no payoff advantages. However, in a world with favoritism, payoffs
3For a classical account of the role of group size effects in collective actions problems, see Olson (1965).
4This result echoes theoretical and empirical findings showing that ethnic conflicts are also most likely in
that case, see Esteban & Ray (1999) and Montalvo & Renyal-Querol (2005).
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are intimately related to group size. In particular, if favoritism is widespread then the payoffs
in a larger group are higher and this payoff advantage grows with size. Similarly, if only one
group practices favoritism, its members earn more than those who abide by the market rule,
and this payoff advantage is increasing in the size of the favoritism group (Propositions 3-4).
This result is consistent with a variety of examples in which small and exclusive minority
groups thrive in empires (for example, the Jewish community in Moorish Spain and in the
Ottoman Empire5 ) and the modern market economy (for example, the Korean community in
urban United States, and Jain community in the market for diamonds).
We then ask: what happens to the payoff advantages of favoritism to a group when growth
opportunities open up and individuals can invest in productivity enhancing actions such as
human capital? We first show that the switch to favoritism always creates greater incentives
for investment (Proposition 5). As investments enhance productivity, this suggests payoff in-
equalities identified above may be reinforced in a more dynamic economy. On the other hand,
within each group, non-expert individuals are competing for jobs with other non-experts: this
leads to a form of rent-seeking. There are thus conflicting forces at work. In a society where
one group practices favoritism while the other group abides by the market, investment oppor-
tunities lead to less payoff inequality. On the other hand, if both groups practice favoritism
then the presence of productivity enhancing investment reinforces the payoff advantage of the
larger group (Proposition 6). The key to understanding the difference in the results under
limited and widespread favoritism is the observation that in a larger group a match between an
employer and an expert is more likely and this lowers wasteful investment by the non-experts.
Our paper is related to three strands of the literature: one, the economics of discrimination,
two, optimal contracts and organization design, and three, the theory of cooperative norms.
The next section places our paper in the context of this literature. The rest of the paper is
organized as follows. Section 3 develops a simple model of jobs and practice of favoritism,
section 4 studies origins of favoritism and section 5 examines its consequences. Section 6
examines the robustness of our results to alternative formulations of the model, while section
7 concludes.
5For popular accounts of this success, see Kotkin (1992) and Gladwell (2008).
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2 Related literature
Favoritism toward one’s own social group may be reinterpreted as discrimination toward out-
siders. Economists have developed two well known theories which explore the origins and
consequences of discrimination. The first theory, which originates in the work of Becker
(1957), takes as a given that individuals have a preference for working with some types of
people and are averse to working with other types, and are willing to pay a price for this
preference. The second theory, originating in the work of Arrow (1972) and Phelps (1972),
starts with the hypothesis that individuals have limited information about the skills and abil-
ities of others, and arrives at ‘favoritism’ as an equilibrium phenomenon which is sustained
by negative beliefs regarding the relation between an observable characteristic (such as race
or gender) and unobservable but endogenous characteristic (such as skill). There is, by now,
a vast empirical literature which assesses the implications of a taste for discrimination and
the role of self-fulfilling beliefs in sustaining wage differentials as well as occupational choices;
see e.g., Altonji and Pierret (1999). However, the relative importance of these alternative
explanations remains a contentious subject; for an illuminating discussion see List (2004). In
addition, these theories cannot account for the exchange of favors that seems to be so prevalent
in real-world favoritism. Given the importance of the subject, and the lack of definite empir-
ical evidence, we believe it is worth asking if favoritism can arise and thrive in the absence of
informational problems and any social preference in favor of one’s own group.
In our paper, individuals who care only about output and earnings practice favoritism
because this maximizes their discounted payoffs. An important and distinct implication of our
approach is that the feasibility of favoritism depends on the size of the groups. This is clearly
different from the standard model of discrimination where discrimination is an argument of
the utility function and bears no relation to the size of the groups which practice it.
Moreover, since individuals only care about earnings and have standard economic prefer-
ences, we can study welfare implications in a straightforward sense. We show that favoritism
is welfare reducing and that this welfare cost is maximal when groups are of equal size. These
costs are consistent with empirical observation; for instance, Becker (1992) argues that welfare
costs of discrimination against blacks in the US are much smaller as compared to the costs in
South Africa (due to the more equal proportions of the different races in the latter).
A few papers study the behavior of firms in the presence of individuals with biased pref-
erences, see Prendergast and Topel (1996), Levine, Weinschelbaum and Zurita (2007). Pren-
dergast and Topel (1996) consider a setting where supervisors have personal preferences over
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subordinates, which lead them to distort their evaluations. They study how this affects the op-
timal organization of the firm. Levine, Weinschelbaum and Zurita (2007) show that when firm
owners have preferences which favor specific individuals, they may end up hiring inefficient
and too many workers.6
A third branch of the literature studies favoritism as an equilibrium of a repeated game
see, e.g., Abdulkadiroglu and Bagwell (2007), Hopenhyn and Hauser (2008), Mobius (2003),
Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1989), Bowles and Gintis (2004) and Kandori (1992). Favoritism
here is an informal practice which leads to more efficient outcomes. Our approach has a
message which is quite the opposite from this traditional view: we show there exist strong
incentives for the emergence of group favoritism, and that this is typically strictly detrimental
from a collective social point of view. In addition our results on productivity enhancing
investments are quite different from the focus of the existing work.
3 A simple model
Individuals are partitioned in two groups A and B of respective sizes gA and gB with gA+gB =
n; we will assume throughout that n ≥ 3.7
At each period t, one individual is picked uniformly at random and gets a production
opportunity. Call him the employer. To realize the production opportunity, this employer
needs to hire an employee. One other individual is picked uniformly at random among the
remaining individuals. This other individual is an expert, most qualified to do the job. If
the employer hires the expert, the output produced is equal to 1. If the employer hires a less
qualified employee, the output produced has a value of l < 1. The employer and the employee
both get an equal share of the output; so if the output is y, they each get y/2. This equal
division of output reflects a variety of considerations such as efficiency, fairness and simplicity.
We discuss the role of the sharing rule in greater detail in section 6.
An important assumption in our model is that there are no information problems for the
employer and that she can always identify the expert. While such information problems are
pervasive and important in economic exchange, our aim here is to show that the practice of
favoritism may emerge due to different reasons.
We shall say that an employer practices market behavior if she offers the job to the expert.
6For studies of favoritism in hiring as a response to adverse selection and moral hazard problems, see
Montgomery (1991), Taylor (2000)) and Duran & Morales (2009).
7Our main results also hold if there are multiple groups.
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By contrast, we shall say that an employer practices favoritism if she hires someone from her
group, irrespective of whether the expert is in her group or not.
We will refer to the situation where a unique group practices favoritism as limited fa-
voritism. We will also study the situation in which all groups practice favoritism; this will be
referred to as widespread favoritism.
Denote by piA the expected payoff of an individual in group A and by WA = gApiA the
expected collective payoff of group A.
4 Trading favors
This section studies the reasons behind the emergence of favoritism. We first look at the
incentives of groups. We find that practicing favoritism is a dominant strategy for a group
so long as the productivity of non-experts is not too low. Favoritism yields greater expected
payoffs for everyone in the group no matter what individuals outside of the group do. It may
not be incentive compatible, however, and its adoption can be viewed as a collective action
problem. In a second step, we show that repeated interactions provide a partial answer to this
problem. We show that favoritism can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium of the
repeated game when players are patient enough. Moreover, incentives to practise favoritism
are higher in smaller groups.
Suppose first that all individuals in a group can costlessly commit, ex- ante, to a common
norm of behavior. Consider a situation where the employer is in group A while the expert
is in group B. If all individuals in A practice favoritism, the employer hires a non-expert
within and both earn 1
2
l. Overall, the group earns l. In contrast, if individuals in A practice
market behavior, the employer hires the expert in the other group. Total payoff is equal to
1 but only half of it goes, through the employer’s payoff, to group A. Therefore, aggregate
payoff in the group is greater under favoritism if l > 1
2
. The following result summarizes these
considerations.
Proposition 1 Suppose that groups can choose between market and favoritism. Favoritism
is a dominant strategy at the group level if and only if l > 1/2. Moreover, aggregate payoff is
higher when both groups practice market behavior.
Proof: There are n(n− 1) ordered potential (employer, expert) pairs: gA(gA− 1) in group A,
gB(gB − 1) in group B, gAgB pairs in A× B and gAgB pairs in B ×A. Let us write down the
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contribution to group welfare of one of these pairs as a function of where the pair lies and the
behavior of the two groups (denoting the behavior of group A first).
A×A B × B A× B B ×A
WA(M,M) 1 0
1
2
1
2
WB(M,M) 0 1
1
2
1
2
WA(F,M) 1 0 l
1
2
WB(F,M) 0 1 0
1
2
WA(F, F ) 1 0 l 0
WB(F, F ) 0 1 0 l
(1)
Suppose, for instance, that both groups practice favoritism. If the employer is in group
A and the expert is in group B, then the employer hires an employee in group A and both
earn 1
2
l, which brings l to group A. This yields us the expression for WA(F, F ) in the 5th row
and 3rd column. Next observe that the behavior of group B is not relevant for the case where
the employer is in group A: in other words WA(F,M) = l. We can similarly derive the other
entries in the table above.
Next, from the table, we see that
WA(F,M)−WA(M,M) = WA(F, F )−WA(M,F ) = gAgB
n(n− 1)(l −
1
2
) (2)
No matter what group B does, the critical situations for group A’s choice are when the
employer is in A while the expert is in B. In these situations, group A obtains a total payoff
of l under favoritism and of 1
2
under market behavior. Thus, favoritism is dominant if and
only if l > 1/2. In addition, when the employer and the expert are in different groups, hiring
within generates a relative loss of 1− l in terms of social welfare.
QED
The intuition behind this result can be viewed from two complementary perspectives.
First, everyone in a group gains from favoritism when the payoff generated by an interaction
within is always greater than the portion of the payoff staying in the group in an interaction
across the two groups. Alternatively, the loss incurred by an employer hiring a non-expert
must always be compensated by the gain of this non-expert. Here, the employer earns 1
2
l
instead of 1
2
, so he loses 1
2
(1 − l) relative to market behavior. The non-expert hired thanks
to favoritism earns 1
2
l, which is greater than 1
2
(1− l) if l is greater than 1
2
. In contrast, when
l < 1
2
, groups may earn more from interactions across groups and strictly prefer to play the
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market. In other words, an employer practicing favoritism loses more than what a favored
group employee earns. In the rest of the paper, we assume that l > 1/2.
Observe also that payoff sharing rule is to split the output equally: employer and employee
each gets half of output produced. Favoritism may, or may not, be dominant under other rules.
We study these issues and the determination of the sharing rule in more detail in section 6.
We now turn to the implementation of favoritism in a world where jobs arrive to individuals
who can then decide on whether to give them to their own group members or to others. When
an employer hires a non-expert from his own group, he incurs a loss in payoff given by 1
2
(1− l).
Moreover, in a static world an expert offered a job will never turn it down. Thus we have
established: market hiring and employment is the unique equilibrium outcome in one-shot
interaction.
Matters are more interesting if individuals interact repeatedly with each other as employers
and employees. When interactions are repeated, in future periods, an individual who is not
an employer or an expert may still be hired by an employer who practices favoritism. This
prospect of future gain may induce an employer today to offer a job to a non-expert from his
own group.
An important preliminary observation is that market behavior is always a subgame perfect
equilibrium. The reason is that in the one-shot interaction, the employer offers the job to the
expert and the expert accepts. So from standard considerations, it follows that repetition
of the one-shot Nash equilibrium constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated
game (see e.g., Mailath and Samuelson, 2006). How robust is this equilibrium? We start by
looking at a simple example of mutual hiring by a group of two people.
Suppose everyone is practising market behavior: following every history, every employer
offers the job to the unique expert, who accepts.
The payoffs from market behavior are
1
2
+
δ
1− δ
1
n
(3)
Consider next two friends who deviate from this strategy to favor each other. They offer
the job to each other, if they are picked to be the employers. The present discounted payoffs
to an employer from this deviation, conditional on all other players abiding by the market,8
are:
8This non-response by outsiders is discussed at length below at the end of this section.
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l +
δ
1− δ
1
n(n− 1)
1
2
[2 + 2(n− 2)l + n− 2] (4)
Simplifying these equations, a player prefers favoritism if
1
2
(1− l) ≤ δ
1− δ
n− 2
n(n− 1)
[
l − 1
2
]
(5)
For l > 1/2 and n > 2, the right hand side of the equation is positive, and so a pair of
patient individuals always has an incentive to practice mutual favoritism. As shown by Propo-
sition 1, both friends earn more in terms of expected utility when they both play favoritism.
Under repeated interactions, the future gains from favoritism to a current employer – which
arise when he is hired as a non-expert – can compensate for his current loss (from hiring
a non-expert). This example motivates a closer examination of the emergence of favoritism
under repeated interactions.
We now develop our concept of favoritism: an employer in a group always hires an employee
within the group, but if an expert in the group is approached by an employer outside the group
then he accepts such an offer.9 Groups may try to enforce the practice of favoritism in a variety
of ways. A simple possibility is that, if someone from the group deviates, then the group stops
offering favors to this person. So the deviator is not hired when he is a non-expert any longer
(though he may still be hired as an expert). We shall refer to this as the threat of losing out
on non-expert hiring. Other punishments, such as ostracism – no hiring of a deviant or being
employed by a deviant – are possible and we discuss them in section 6. As usual, strategies
must specify actions following every possible history. In particular, group members who fail to
punish deviators must be punished themselves. The details of the repeated game, the notation
and the solution concept are presented in the Appendix.
Given some group size g, define δ∗(g) as the unique solution to the equation:
1
2
(1− l) = δ
∗
1− δ∗
n− g
n(n− 1)
[
l − 1
2
]
(6)
Observe that δ∗ is an increasing function of group size g.
Proposition 2 Suppose l > 1/2 and consider a group of size g. Favoritism (under the threat
of losing out on non-expert hiring) is a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the repeated game if
9We study a stronger form of favoritism in which individuals only interact with own group members in
section 6.
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and only if δ ∈ [δ∗(g), 1]. Moreover, since δ∗ is increasing with g, favoritism is easier to
sustain in smaller groups.
The proof is provided in the appendix. We need to verify that favoritism constitutes an
equilibrium, after every possible history at any date t. It turns out that these conditions
reduce to simple computations similar to those presented in the example above. The left
hand side of equation (6) captures the one-shot cost incurred by an employer hiring a non-
expert within. The right hand side is proportional to the relative gain of belonging to a group
practicing favoritism. Thus, the key mechanism is that favors expected to be received in
the future can compensate for the current costs of providing one. Equation (6) also clarifies
the relation between individual and group incentives. It is only because a group practicing
favoritism brings higher payoff to its members (since l ≥ 1/2) that individuals may be inclined
to practice favoritism. In turn, this explains the size effects. Individual gains to belong to a
group practicing favoritism are decreasing in the group’s size, as the competition for favors
between group members increases. Thus, favoritism is a collective action problem and is
harder to sustain in larger groups.
How does a change in economic fundamentals affect the prevalence of favoritism? Observe
that an increase in l has two effects which go in the same direction. It reduces the cost of
practicing favoritism, as non-experts are more efficient. It also increases the relative benefit
from belonging to a group which practices favoritism, since the relative gain of a favored non-
expert increases while the relative loss of an employer decreases. Therefore, δ∗ is decreasing
in l. Favoritism becomes more prevalent if non-experts become more efficient.
We now briefly relate our results to empirical patterns highlighted in the research in labor
economics. One prediction of our model is that favoritism equilibrium exhibits lower wages.
This is consistent with empirical evidence on wage discount on jobs found through social
contacts, see e.g., Loury (2006), Simon and Warner (1992), Bentolila, Michelacci and Suarez
(2004) and Sylos-Labini (2004). A second prediction of our model is that favoritism is only
possible when non-experts are not too inefficient relative to experts (l > 1/2). Productivity
differences are likely to be smaller in semi-skilled/less-skilled work as compared to highly
skilled work. Thus our result is consistent with empirical evidence for the greater use of social
networks in less skilled jobs, see e.g., Ioannides and Loury (2004), Granovetter (1974), Rees
(1966), Scoppa (2009), and Montgomery (1991).
Justifying the absence of a response to favoritism: We have assumed that the practice of
favoritism by a group does not provoke a response from those outside the group. In other
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words, there are no penalties or punishments on those who practice favoritism. We explore
the role of this assumption now. A good point to start is to return to the example of a market
economy in which two friends deviate. Suppose, to fix ideas, that the two friends are penalized
by a legal authority: this penalty takes the form of no future employment being offered to
these friends by those who abide by the market rules. The per period payoff to the deviating
individual is:
1
n
[
n− 2
n− 1
1
2
l +
1
n− 1
1
2
]
+
n− 1
n
[
1
n− 1
[
1
n− 1
1
2
+
n− 2
n− 1
1
2
l
]]
=
1
n(n− 1) [(n− 2)l + 1] (7)
It is easily checked that this payoff is lower than the payoff from the market 1/n. Hence,
a permanent ban on employment in the market acts a deterrent to favoritism. What are the
circumstances under which such penalties will be implemented successfully?
One possible way in which penalties can be implemented is through a combination of
formal legal and administrative institutions. The main difficulty an institution is likely to face
is to establish that favoritism has actually taken place. Such formal procedures require clear
and verifiable evidence; but in many, if not most settings, output is difficult to measure and
specifically attribute to individual actions.10
A second way is for penalties to be carried out by individual agents who are involved in the
trade or in employment (and therefore have access to information). However, decentralized
punishments are constrained by individual incentive problems. Suppose group A abides by
the market while group B practices favoritism. Punishment by an individual in group A of
someone in group B must take the form of not employing an expert in that group. Not hiring
an expert is costly for the employer, and he must be compensated for this cost. However, the
market rule dictates that, in every period, only experts are hired. So the market does not have
a natural compensation mechanism to reward individuals in group A for their efforts. Let
us turn next to the scenario in which both groups A and B practice favoritism. The natural
form of punishment by group A individuals is to not hire an expert who belongs to group B.
But in the widespread favoritism equilibrium, by construction, individuals in group A do not
have incentives to offer group B members any jobs. So this punishment is not meaningful.
10Take for instance, a well known lament: it is easier to publish papers in prestigious journals if an author is
well connected to the editor. Laband and Piette (1994) explore this claim for economics. They find evidence
that connections indeed help but also argue that this partiality can be explained by a greater ability of editors
to discern quality in their own fields of expertise (they measure quality in terms of citations of the published
papers).
12
In view of these considerations, we feel it is reasonable to assume that the practice of
favoritism by a group does not provoke a response from those outside the group.
5 The consequences of favoritism
We examine the effects of favoritism on efficiency, inequality and productivity enhancing
investment. In a market economy a single group gains by practising favoritism, while the rest
of the population, which abides by the market, loses. In a setting with widespread favoritism,
on the other hand, members of both groups lose, relative to the market. Favoritism leads to
tasks being assigned inefficiently; the welfare loss due to favoritism is greatest when the groups
are of equal size. Favoritism has serious implications for inequality: a switch to favoritism by
a group increases the payoffs of its members. Moreover, the payoff advantage of favoritism
is increasing with the size of the group which switches to favoritism. Finally, we introduce
the possibility of productivity enhancing investments. We identify circumstances under which
payoff advantages of favoritism are reinforced or mitigated, respectively.
5.1 Welfare and inequality
Consider first the implications of one group switching to favoritism while the other group
abides by the market rule, i.e., limited favoritism. When everyone abides by the market, since
the model is symmetric every individual has an equal chance of being a part of a productive
pair. Therefore, using (1), we can write the individual payoff as:
piA(M,M) = piB(M,M) =
1
n
(8)
Next suppose that group A practices favoritism, while group B members abide by market
behavior. An individual in the group practicing favoritism earns:
piA(F,M) =
1
n(n− 1)
[
gA − 1 + (l + 1
2
)(n− gA)
]
(9)
By contrast, the payoff to member of the market abiding group B is:
piB(M,F ) =
1
n(n− 1)
[
n− 1− 1
2
gA
]
(10)
An inspection of (8)-(10), reveals a switch to favoritism by a group increases its payoffs
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but lowers the payoffs of the outsiders who abide by the rules of the market. Moreover, the
payoffs of the favoritism group are also higher than payoffs which accrue if everyone abides
by the market.
Next consider a society in which all groups practice favoritism, i.e., the case of widespread
favoritism. Individual payoffs in group A and group B are respectively:
piA(F, F ) =
1
n(n− 1) [gA − 1 + l(n− gA)] (11)
piB(F, F ) =
1
n(n− 1) [gN − 1 + l(n− gB)] (12)
An inspection of equations (8)-(12) reveals that payoffs are higher in the larger group but
payoffs of both groups are lower than the market payoff.
Favoritism involves a inefficient match between an employer and a non-expert: so it entails
a welfare loss. The magnitude of the welfare loss is determined by how often the employer
and the expert are in different groups. In our model, these situations occur most frequently
when groups have equal sizes. Favoritism is practised in effect when the expert and employer
lie in different groups. The probability of this mismatch is maximal when the two groups are
of equal size. The following result summarizes these observations.
Proposition 3 (i). Suppose favoritism is limited to one group: payoffs in favoritism group
are larger than the payoffs in a market which are larger than the payoffs in a market abiding
group. (ii). Suppose favoritism is widespread: payoffs are higher in the larger group but both
payoffs are lower than payoffs in the market. Aggregate payoff loss from favoritism is maximal
in a society with two equal size groups.11
A recurring theme in the discrimination and favoritism is its relation to inequality. Observe
first that there is no inequality in the market regime since individuals are ex-ante homogeneous
and everyone earns 1/n. Suppose that group A practices favoritism while group B abides by
market rules. Subtracting (10) from (9) yields us:
piA − piB = 1
n(n− 1)
[
(l − 1
2
)n+ (1− l)gA
]
. (13)
11The welfare loss is of course higher under widespread favoritism as compared to limited favoritism (holding
group sizes constant).
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So there is always a difference in payoffs across groups and the payoff advantage of the
favoritism group increases with its size. Finally consider widespread favoritism:
piA − piB = 1
n(n− 1)(1− l)(gA − gB) (14)
The larger group earns higher payoffs, and this difference is increasing in the size of the
majority. These observations on inequality are summarized in the following result.
Proposition 4 An individual’s payoff advantage from practicing favoritism is increasing in
the size of own group.12
5.2 Productivity enhancing investment
We have seen that larger groups fare better than smaller groups under favoritism. We now
examine an economy in which growth opportunities open up and individuals can invest in
productivity enhancing actions. Our interest is in understanding how favoritism shapes indi-
vidual incentives and, in particular, if the availability of productivity enhancing investment
opportunities mitigates or exacerbates the payoff advantages of large groups.
Suppose that individuals can improve their productivity through costly investment c > 0.
This investment raises productivity by a factor ρe > 0 for an expert and by ρn > 0 for a
non-expert. Thus an educated expert produces 1+ ρe while an educated non-expert produces
l(1 + ρn). A special case of this is ρe = ρn which we may interpret investment as general
purpose education. We will assume throughout that l(1 + ρn) < 1: this means that an
educated non-expert produces less than an expert.
How does favoritism affect incentives for investment? Suppose group B plays by market
rules, and let us consider the effects of group A switching to favoritism. There are two factors
at work. On the one hand, an expert in group A is always hired, irrespective of the identity
of the employer. On the other hand, an expert in group B will not be hired with positive
probability (when the employer is in group A). The second factor is that a non-expert in
group A has a chance of being hired if the employer is in group A and the expert is in group
B. Both these factors make investment for members of group A more attractive. A similar
12Another way to study inequality is to look at payoff variance. We can show that under limited favoritism,
variance first increases and then decreases as gA increases from 0 to n. At some point, adding one other
individual to the favoritism group dominates the fact that the other group becomes relatively poorer. Similarly,
variance first increases and then decreases as gA increases from n/2 to n under widespread favoritism.
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incentive enhancing effect also obtains when group B also practice favoritism. The following
result summarizes these arguments.
Proposition 5 Suppose l(1+ρn) < 1. A switch to favoritism by a group raises the incentives
to invest in that group and lowers the incentives to invest in the other group.
This result is consistent with empirical evidence that favoritism toward one’s own group
(and discrimination against outsiders) creates substantial differences in incentives to acquire
education and human capital across communities, see e.g., Becker (1957, 1964), Loury (1992)
and Goldberg (1982). More generally, our result is consistent with the finding that social ties
facilitate greater capital intensity of production, reported in Banerjee and Munshi (2004).13
Proposition 5 demonstrates that favoritism creates greater incentives for investment. In-
vestments enhance productivity and this could potentially reinforce the payoff inequalities
identified in Proposition 3. However investment is costly, and non-experts who are educated
are competing for ‘rents’ with other non-experts. These forces go in opposite directions and
necessitate a careful analysis of payoffs. For simplicity, we restrict attention to interior equi-
librium for groups practicing favoritism.
Suppose favoritism is limited: group A practices favoritism while group B abides by the
market. In an interior equilibrium in group A, investors and non-investors in A obtain the
same payoff. Moreover, since payoffs are falling in number of investors and returns from
investing are always larger in the favoritism group, it must be the case that no one invests in
group B. In an interior equilibrium, the payoffs in group A and group B are, respectively:
piA =
1
2n(n− 1) [gA − 1 + kAρe + l(1 + ρn)(n− gA) + n− 1] (15)
piB =
1
2n(n− 1) [n− 1 + kAρe + n− gA − 1] . (16)
So the difference in payoffs under favoritism, in the presence of investment opportunities
is:
∆piI = piA − piB = 1
2n(n− 1) [gA + (l(1 + ρn)− 1)(n− gA)] . (17)
From equation (13) we know that payoff difference between groups A and B in the basic
mode is:
13For an interesting and related analysis of social connections and access to financial loans on softer terms,
see Charumilind, Kali and Wiwatankantang (2006).
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∆piN = piA − piB = 1
2n(n− 1)[gA + (2l − 1)(n− gA)]. (18)
Since l(1 + ρn)− 1 < 0 < 2l − 1, it follows that payoff advantages from favoritism decline
with the arrival of productivity enhancing opportunities.
There are two forces which account for this surprising result: one, employers in group B
can use the investments by experts in group B, while the employers in group A do not have
access to such investments by experts in group B. Two, as pointed out in Proposition 5,
incentives to invest are higher in a group which practices favoritism due to employment of
non-experts. However, the competition between non-experts drives rents to zero in an interior
equilibrium.
Next consider widespread favoritism: Suppose the investment game has an interior solution
in both groups. The payoffs to group A and group B are, respectively:
piA =
1
2n(n− 1) [2(gA − 1) + kAρe + l(1 + ρn)(n− gA)] (19)
piB =
1
2n(n− 1)[2(gB − 1) + kBρe + l(1 + ρn)(n− gB)] (20)
Subtracting (20) from (19) yields us:
∆piI =
1
2n(n− 1) [(2− l(1 + ρn))(gA − gB) + (kA − kB)ρe] (21)
Recall, from equation (14), that the payoff difference between two favoritism groups in the
basic model is:
∆piN =
1
2n(n− 1)[2(1− l)(gA − gB)]. (22)
Since kA > kB and 2− 2l < 1 < 2− l(1 + ρn), it follows that investment opportunities re-
inforce payoff advantages of larger groups! The discussion on payoff implication of investment
opportunities are summarized in our next result. The statement expresses payoff advantages
relative to the scenario with no productivity enhancing investment.
Proposition 6 Consider an interior equilibrium for groups practicing favoritism in the in-
vestment game. (i) Suppose favoritism is limited: the presence of productivity enhancing
investment lowers the payoff advantage of the favoritism group. (ii) Suppose favoritism is
widespread: the presence of productivity enhancing investment reinforces the payoff advantage
17
of the larger group.
The key to understanding the difference between the limited and widespread favoritism
cases is the following observation: in a larger group a match between an employer and an
expert is more likely and this lowers rent seeking activity among non-experts.
6 Discussion
This section takes up a number of themes relating to the practice of favoritism.
6.1 Ostracism
This section examines the prospects of favoritism under more severe punishments. If an
individual deviates, she is ostracized by the other group members: they do not offer her a
job in the future but they still accept to work for her. Moreover, this ostracism is recursive:
if an employer deviates from this ostracism punishment then she is in turn ostracized by his
own group. At the extreme, if only two individuals remain who have not deviated and one of
the two deviates, the other reverts to market behavior. Observe that punishments are more
severe than under hiring favoritism which we studied in the basic model: here a deviant is not
hired even he is an expert.
Our next result shows that hiring favoritism can be sustained as an equilibrium of the
repeated game. Let δHO = δ
∗(2) denote the unique solution to the equation
1
2
(1− l) = δ
1− δ
n− 2
n(n− 1)(l −
1
2
) (23)
Proposition 7 Suppose l > 1/2. Hiring favoritism under the threat of ostracism is a subgame
perfect equilibrium if and only if δ ∈ [δHO, 1].
Proposition 7 shows that the condition under which hiring favoritism under the threat of
ostracism is stable does not depend on group sizes. This appears at first sight to be surprising
and indeed an inspection of the computations reveals that an individual has a lower incentive
to deviate if the group is larger. This is intuitive: being ostracized from a larger group is
more costly because it leads to a smaller set of potential partners. However, the robustness of
favoritism depends on the incentives of members to punish deviators with ostracism. So we
need to verify that Mr. k member wishes to punish k+1th who deviates. However, this in turn
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depends on the incentive of the k−1th member’s incentives to punish Mr. k. This in turns on
the incentive of Mr k−2, and so on. Through a backward induction argument, the credibility
of the overall punishment scheme relies on its being credible when only 2 individuals remain.
Observe that the incentive condition here is identical to equation (5). As soon as one pair of
individuals has a joint incentive to deviate from market behavior, favoritism practiced by all
groups, small or large, is stable.
Favoritism under strong ostracism: If an individual deviates, the group members refuse to
interact with her again, either as an employee or as an employer. If in a subsequent period
an employer or an employee deviates from the punishment, then he in in turn is ostracized
by the remaining group members. Again, at the extreme, if only two individuals remain who
have not deviated and one of the two deviates, the other reverts to market behavior.
We show that favoritism under the threat of strong ostracism cannot be sustained in a
subgame perfect equilibrium. Under strong favoritism, an expert cannot work for an employer
outside the group. This increases the costs of favoritism without increasing its benefits and
the costs now dominate.
Proposition 8 Favoritism under the threat of strong ostracism cannot be sustained in a sub-
game perfect equilibrium.
6.2 Rule of output division
In our basic model, the bargaining outcome takes the form of equal split: the employer and
expert each get one half while the employer and non-expert each get l/2. This division of
output is simple and a natural one in many ways, but it is one of many different ways in
which the output can be divided between the two individuals. So we would like to understand
the aspects of the rule that are important for our results.
An important element of the division of output between two players is that it takes place
against a background of other opportunities for them. Consider for instance a benchmark of
pure, frictionless competition. Suppose that every potential employee (expert and all non-
experts) can costlessly bid to work for the employer. The employer offers the job to the person
who offers him the highest earnings. The natural equilibrium of this process of bidding is one in
which the expert asks for 1− l, and all the non-experts offer to work for 0. The employer hires
the expert and earns l. Let us examine the prospects of favoritism in this setting. Suppose
that a similar bidding process also allocates surplus for favoritism hiring: An employer hiring
a non-expert earns l while the non-expert earns 0. Here, competition within groups reduces
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the rents of non-experts to zero while the employer is indifferent between hiring an expert and
a non-expert. Thus, individuals have no incentive to engage in favoritism, since there is no
favor expected in the future. This shows the crucial role played by the rule of output division.
We next study arbitrary rules and the prospects of emergence of favoritism when departing
from this benchmark. Our main point is that favoritism is easier to sustain in the presence of
fairness in rule of output division.
Consider the following arbitrary division of output. The employer earns α when he hires
an expert and βl when he hires a non-expert. Thus, 1 − α and 1 − β capture the portion of
the output earned by the expert and non-expert employees. When does a collective switch to
favoritism leads to an increase in the utility of everyone in a group? Observe that an employer
hiring a non-expert loses α − βl with respect to market behavior. In contrast, the favored
group member gains (1 − β)l. Thus, expected utility in the group increases if and only if
α − βl < (1 − β)l ⇔ α < l. The individual gain to the employer in a market transaction
must be lower than the total gain in a favor-based interaction. Then, as in section 3, we can
show that favoritism may be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game
for sufficiently patient players if and only if α < l.14 Overall, favoritism may emerge under
unequal surplus division as long as the inequality is not too high.
For instance, suppose that the division of surplus in favor-based transactions is determined
exogenously, e.g. through social norms of fairness internal to the group. In contrast, suppose
that this division in market-based interactions is determined via bargaining between the em-
ployer and the expert. In the absence of frictions, the employer can always threaten to hire a
non-expert and earn βl. Thus, Nash bargaining between the employer and the expert leads to
an allocation of 1
2
+ 1
2
βl to the employer. Applying the previous finding, favoritism emerges if
and only if 1
2
+ 1
2
βl < l, which is equivalent to
β < βˆ = 2− 1
l
Observe that β cannot be too high: else the employer has a very attractive outside option which
enables him to extract most of the surplus in market-based interactions. The expected future
gains from a favor are then simply not attractive enough compared to the losses from hiring
within. In addition, βˆ increases with l. As non-experts become more efficient, favoritism
becomes easier to sustain which confirms earlier related results obtained under equal split.
14The division of surplus in favor-based transactions, β, affects the incentives to deviate, and hence also
affects the range of discount rates under which favoritism is subgame perfect.
20
This suggests favoritism may emerge from fairness considerations within groups and even in
the absence of frictions in the market.
In many societies, there exist minimum wage laws which may have put in place to protect
the interest of workers. One reason for these laws is that they protect the interests of ‘workers’.
Presumably, this protection is needed as bilateral bargaining may yield an ‘unfair’ outcome.
Thus, a natural interpretation of these laws is that they stipulate fair and equitable rules of
division. Affirmative action rules have a similar foundation: they seek to provide opportunities
for individuals who may otherwise not be hired. In doing so, they strive to promote equitable
terms of recruitment. Minimum wage laws are now in place in a wide range of economies, spe-
cially those in the OECD countries. Similarly, affirmative action policies have been enshrined
into law in many countries, both rich and poor. So we believe that fairness considerations
embodied in our assumption of the equal split rule are descriptively well founded.
We conclude this discussion by noting that the presence of frictions make the emergence of
favoritism even more likely. At the extreme, suppose for instance that an employer can only
bargain with one player in a period and that the transaction opportunity lapses after that
period. Here, competition has no bite as the employer has no more outside options. Then
the equal split between employer and employee is a reasonable outcome. More generally,
transaction costs and bargaining frictions lower the employers’ outside options, hence they
limit the inequality of output division and facilitate the emergence of favoritism.
7 Conclusion
Favoritism is the act of offering jobs, contracts and resources to members of one’s social group
in preference to outsiders. Favoritism is widely practiced and this motivates an exploration
of its origins and economic consequences.
Our main finding is that individuals will find it in their self-interest to trade favors over
time and that this will come at the expense of others, who are outside their group. This form
of favoritism is relatively easier to sustain in smaller groups. Favoritism entails social costs as
it usually leads to inefficient allocations. However, favoritism can lead to payoff advantages
for larger groups. Productivity enhancing investments are larger in groups which practice
favoritism. The availability of investment opportunities can reinforce payoff inequalities across
groups.
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8 Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let us first define some notation and terminology for the repeated
game. In any period t = 1, 2..., nature picks a employer mt ∈ N , and conditional on this
employer picks an expert from the complementary set N\{mt}. Each player has an equal
and independent chance of being picked as employer in each period. Moreover, conditional
on choice of employer, each of the other players have an equal and independent (across time)
probability of being chosen as experts. In each period t, the employer mt chooses to offer
the job to someone amt ∈ Nmt where Nmt = N\{mt}. Player amt ∈ N , is the respondent;
he chooses a response, ramt ∈ {1, 0}, where 1 stands for YES and 0 stands for NO. Define
pt = {mt, et, amt , ramt}.
At time t, the history of the game consists of moves of nature in choice of employer and
expert and the actions of the employer and the respondent. Define history at time t as
ht = {p1, p2, ...pt−1}. Let Ht be the set of possible histories at time t. The strategy of an
employer picked at time t is smt : Ht → Nmt , while the strategy of a respondent chosen by mt
is samt : Ht → {1, 0}. All other players have no choice of action at time t.
An employer practices hiring favoritism if she offers the job to a member of her own group.
Formally, if mt ∈ gx then smt(.) = et if et ∈ gx and some player j ∈ gx otherwise. In the
latter case, the player is chosen at random with equal probability across all members of group
(excluding mt). At the start of the game, t = 1, the favoritism strategy for employer m1 ∈ gx
where x = A,B, is simply: sm1 = e1 if e1 ∈ gx and j ∈ gx\{m1}, otherwise. The respondent
am1 ’s strategy is ram1 = 1.
Consider time t ≥ 2. Suppose mt is the employer and mt ∈ gx, for x = A,B. Given history
ht, the employer knows for each date τ < t, the employer mτ the expert eτ and their actions
amτ and ramt . Start at time t = 2: the employer constructs an effective group as follows:
if m1 ∈ gx, then she checks if m1 followed favoritism. If yes, this employer remains in her
effective group. If m1 deviated from favoritism then m2 excludes her from her effective group
at date t = 2. Next she turns to the respondents, and checks if am1 ∈ gx,1. If yes, then she
verifies if am1 accepted the offer made to him. If yes then respondent remains in her effective
group; if no, then she excludes him from the effective group. Using these operations she then
defines an effective group gx,2 at date t = 2. Employer m2 then has the favoritism strategy:
sm2 = e2 if e1 ∈ gx,2 and some j ∈ gx,2\{m2}, otherwise. The respondent am2 at date t = 2
always accepts an offer ram2 = 1.
The effective groups are defined recursively for any time period t. In particular, at any
22
point t, it is common knowledge if a player is in an effective group gA,t or gB,t or out of these
groups. Define dA,t = gA,1− gA,t and dA,t = gA,1− gA,t, as the players who have been excluded
from groups A and B, respectively, between periods τ = 1 and τ = t − 1. The favoritism
strategy for employermt ∈ gx,t, at time t is then simply: smt = et if et ∈ gx,t and j ∈ gx,t\{mt},
otherwise. Employers who are not in an effective group, mt ∈ dA,t ∪ dB,t offer the job to the
expert: smt = et. The respondent amt always accepts an offer ramt = 1.
In period t = 1, if she is the employer m1 = i, then sm1 = e1 if e1 ∈ gx and j ∈ gx\{m1},
otherwise. If she is the respondent i = sm1 , then ri = 1. For t ≥ 2: if i = mt and history ht a
member of an effective group practices favoritism within effective group as follows: smt = et
if et ∈ gx and j ∈ gx,t\{m1}, otherwise. If i = smt , she accepts the offer, ri = 1. Players who
are not members of effective groups play the market: always offer jobs to experts and accept
all offers made to them.
There are two types of histories: one, where effective groups are the initial groups, and two,
where they have changed as players have deviated. Let us take them up them in sequence.
History with (gx,t, gy,t) = (gx, gy). Consider the choice of an employer when the expert is
in the other group, as the incentives to deviate are greatest in this situation. If he hires within
the group, he earns
1
2
l +
δ
1− δ
[
1
n
[
gx − 1
n− 1
1
2
+
n− gx
n− 1
1
2
l
]
+
n− 1
n
[
gx − 1
n− 1
[
1
n− 1
1
2
+
n− 2
n− 1
n− gx
n− 2
1
gx − 1
1
2
l
]]]
.
(24)
This can be simplified to:
1
2
l +
δ
1− δ
1
n(n− 1) [gx − 1 + l(n− gx)] (25)
On the other hand, if he deviates and offers the job to an expert outside the group, he
earns
1
2
+
δ
1− δ
[
1
n
gx − 1
n− 1
1
2
+
1
n
n− gx
n− 1
1
2
+
n− 1
n
[
gx − 1
n− 1
[
1
n− 1
1
2
]]]
. (26)
Either an individual is the employer (with probability 1
n
) and he gets 1
2
, or he is the expert
and the employer is in his group (with probability 1
n−1
gx−1
n
) and he also gets 1
2
. This can be
rewritten as follows:
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12
+
δ
1− δ
1
n(n− 1)
[
1
2
(gx − 1) + 1
2
(n− 1)
]
. (27)
So, a player practices favoritism if
1− l < δ
1− δ
1
n(n− 1)(2l − 1)(n− gx) (28)
Second, consider a history in which (gx,t, gy,t) 6= (gx, gy). Notice first that for someone who
has deviated already, there is positive cost to practicing favoritism but no gain, as ex-group
members do not offer favors after a deviation. Hence for a deviating player it is clearly optimal
to practice market behavior. Similarly, it is easy to see that the respondent will always find it
optimal to accept an offer. So, again we need to check the incentives of an employer mt ∈ gx
who is faced with an expert et /∈ gx. If he hires within the group, he earns
1
2
l +
δ
1− δ
[
1
n
[
gx − 1
n− 1
1
2
+
n− gx
n− 1
1
2
l
]]
+
δ
1− δ
[
n− 1
n
[
gx,t − 1
n− 1
{
1
n− 1
1
2
+
n− 2
n− 1
n− gx
n− 2
1
gx,t − 1
1
2
l
}
+
gx − gx,t
n− 1
1
n− 1
1
2
]]
+
δ
1− δ
[
n− 1
n
gy − gy,t
n− 1
1
n− 1
1
2
]
. (29)
This can be simplified to:
1
2
l +
δ
1− δ
1
n(n− 1)
[
gx − 1 + l(n− gx) + 1
2
(gy − gy,t)
]
(30)
If the employer deviates, his payoff is equal to
1
2
+
δ
1− δ
[
1
n
1
2
+
n− 1
n
[
gx − 1
n− 1
1
n− 1
1
2
+
gy − gy,t
n− 1
1
n− 1
1
2
]]
. (31)
Therefore, playing favoritism in this case is individually rational if
1− l < δ
1− δ
(n− gx)
n(n− 1)(2l − 1). (32)
We observe that the incentives to practice favoritism do not depend on the history of the
game so long as there are at least two members in the effective group for a player.
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Finally, define δ∗ as the unique solution to the equation:
1− l = δ
∗
1− δ∗
n− g
n(n− 1)(2l − 1) (33)
Observe that δ∗ is an increasing function of group size g. The result now follows.
QED
Proof of Proposition 3: We have W (M,M) = WA(M,M) + WB(M,M) = 1. Under
prevalent favoritism,
W (F, F ) = W (M,M)− 2gAgB
n(n− 1)(1− l)
since each interaction within generates a social loss of 1− l. Similarly, under limited favoritism
W (F,M) = W (M,M)− gAgB
n(n− 1)(1− l)
In both cases, the loss is maximized when gAgB is maximized.
QED
Proof of Proposition 5: Suppose first that both groups play the market. Let us write down
the payoff from NOT INVESTING, when k others have invested:
piM,M(N, k) =
1
n
[
k
n− 1
1
2
(1 + ρe) +
n− 1− k
n− 1
1
2
]
+
1
n
1
2
(34)
where the first part represents the payoff if the individual is the employer and the second
part the payoff if the individual is the expert. The payoffs to INVESTMENT, if k ≥ 1 others
invest are:
piM,M(I, k) =
1
n
[
k
n− 1
1
2
(1 + ρe) +
n− 1− k
n− 1
1
2
]
+
1
n
1
2
(1 + ρe)− c (35)
Investing only affects payoffs via the effects on the employee, as it does not change the
payoff of an educated person who is an employer. This is reflected in the following expression:
piM,M(I, k)− piM,M(N, k) = 1
n
1
2
ρe − c (36)
Thus, in a market, everyone invests if ρe > 2nc and no one invests if ρe < 2nc.
Next, suppose that group A switches to favoritism. A market participant in group B now
earns returns from education only when he is an expert AND the employer is an outsider as
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well. So the net payoffs from investing for a member of group B are:
piM,F (I)− piM,F (N) = ρe
2n
− ρegA
2n(n− 1) − c (37)
The payoff to a group A member from NOT INVESTING when kA ≥ 1 others in his group
have invested is:
piF,M(N, kA) =
1
n
[
gA − 1
n− 1
[
kA
gA − 1
1
2
(1 + ρe) +
gA − 1− kA
gA − 1
1
2
]
+
n− gA
n− 1
1
2
l(1 + ρn)
]
+
n− 1
n
1
n− 1
1
2
. (38)
The first line reflects payoffs when individual is the employer. There are two sub-cases cor-
responding to whether the expert is in own group or in the other group. If expert is own
group then we need to keep track of whether he is educated or uneducated. The second line
covers the case when the individual is not an employer. He now earns a payoff only if he is
the expert, since kA ≥ 1 group members have invested.
The payoff to INVESTING when kA ≥ 1 others invest is:
piF,M(I, kA) =
1
n
[
gA − 1
n− 1
[
kA
gA − 1
1
2
(1 + ρe) +
gA − 1− kA
gA − 1
1
2
]
+
n− gA
n− 1
1
2
l(1 + ρn)
]
+
n− 1
n
1
2
[
1
n− 1(1 + ρe) +
n− 2
n− 1
n− gA
n− 2
[
kA
gA − 1
1
kA
+
gA − 1− kA
gA − 1
1
kA + 1
]
l(1 + ρn)
]
−c. (39)
The first line is the payoff if the individual is the employer. The second line covers the case
when the individual is not an employer. In the latter case, if he is an expert he earns (1+ρn)/2,
while if he is not an expert he is employed only if the employer he is in his group and the
expert is not. Moreover, the probability of being hired also depends also on whether the
employer is a educated or non-educated, as this affects the competition among the educated
non-experts.
Subtracting (38) from (39) yields us the returns to someone in group A when kA ≥ 1 others
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invest:15
piF,M(I, kA)− piF,M(N, kA) = ρe
2n
+
(n− gA)
2n(n− 1)
gAl(1 + ρn)
kA + 1
− c. (40)
An inspection of (37) and (40) with (36) reveals that when group A switches to favoritism
this raises the returns from investment to its members, and at the same time lowers the returns
from investment for members of group B.
Next we consider effects of switching to favoritism in a setting where the other group
practices favoritism. If the employer is in one group and the expert is in the other, the
employer now hires a non-expert within but he prefers to hire one who is educated. Consider
an individual in group A. The payoff of NOT INVESTING when kA ≥ 1 other individuals in
his group have invested is:
piF,F (N, kA) =
1
n
[
gA − 1
n− 1
[
kA
gA − 1
1
2
(1 + ρe) +
gA − 1− kA
gA − 1
1
2
]
+
n− gA
n− 1
1
2
l(1 + ρn)
]
+
n− 1
n
gA − 1
n− 1
[
1
n− 1
1
2
]
(41)
The payoff to INVESTING in human capital, if kA ≥ 1 others invest is:
piF,F (I, kA) =
1
n
[
gA − 1
n− 1
[
kA
gA − 1
1
2
(1 + ρe) +
gA − 1− kA
gA − 1
1
2
]
+
n− gA
n− 1
1
2
l(1 + ρn)
]
+
n− 1
n
gA − 1
n− 1
1
2
[
1
n− 1(1 + ρe) +
gB
n− 1
[
kA
gA − 1
1
kA
+
gA − 1− kA
gA − 1
1
kA + 1
]
l(1 + ρn)
]
−c. (42)
15When kA = 0, the returns to investment are
ρe
2n
+
(n− gA)
2n(n− 1)(gA − 1)l(1 + ρn)− c
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Simplifying (41) and (42), we obtain returns from investment when k ≥ 1 others invest:16
piF,F (I, kA)− piF,F (N, kA) = 1
n(n− 1)
1
2
[
(gA − 1)ρe + (n− gA)l(1 + ρn) gA
kA + 1
]
− c (43)
Recall from equation (37) that the returns to an individual in the market faced with a
group which practices favoritism are ρe(gA − 1)/2n(n− 1). A comparison with equation (43)
reveals that returns are larger when group switches to favoritism. This completes the proof.
QED
Proof of Proposition 7: Let us start with period t = 1 strategies. Consider the employer
m1. Suppose without loss of generality she is in group gx, where x = A,B. The incentives to
deviate from favoritism are clearly larger when e1 /∈ gx. It is sufficient to check that favoritism
is optimal even if e1 /∈ gx,1. In this case, hiring within the group yields:
1
2
l +
δ
1− δ
1
n(n− 1) [gx,1 − 1 + l(n− gx,1)] . (44)
In contrast, an offer to the expert e1 /∈ gx yields
1
2
+
δ
1− δ
[
1
2n
]
. (45)
if gx > 2 and
1
2
+
δ
1− δ
[
1
2n
+
1
2n(n− 1)
]
(46)
when gx = 2.
When gx > 2, this holds if and only if:
1
2
[1− l] ≤ δ
1− δ
1
n(n− 1)
[
(gx,1 − 1 + l(n− gx,1))− 1
2
(n− 1)
]
. (47)
The term within the square brackets simplifies to
gx,1[1− l] + n
2
(2l − 1)− 1
2
(48)
16When kA = 0, similar computations lead to
piF (I, 0)− piF (N, 0) = 1
n(n− 1)
1
2
[(gA − 1)ρe + (n− gA)l(1 + ρn)(gA − 1)]− c
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and is always positive, if l > 1/2. Define δ0(gx) as the cutoff value of the discount factor
for which favoritism is incentive compatible. Using equation (47), we can write this as:
1− l = δ0
1− δ0
1
n(n− 1) [2gx,1[1− l] + n(2l − 1)− 1] . (49)
1− l = δ0
1− δ0
1
n(n− 1) [2gx,1[1− l] + 2n(2l − 1)− 2] . (50)
When gx = 2, the corresponding equation becomes
1− l = δ0
1− δ0
1
n(n− 1)(2l − 1)(n− 2) (51)
In any case, δ0 is decreasing with gx and is highest for gx = 2.
Next consider the respondent’s strategy at time t = 1. If respondent is the expert and
accepts the offer, his payoff is:
1
2
+
δ
1− δ
1
n(n− 1) [gA − 1 + l(n− gA)] , (52)
If the expert respondent deviates and rejects the offer he is ostracized and earns:
δ
1− δ
1
n(n− 1)
[
1
2n
]
. (53)
if gx,1 > 2. It is easy to verify that we know the payoffs from ostracism are smaller than
the payoffs from following the norm. So the expert respondent will always accept an offer.
Similar considerations imply that a non-expert respondent will always accept an offer.
Next consider a period t ≥ 2: Suppose mt is the employer and mt ∈ gx,t, for x = A,B.
Given history ht, we derive (gA,t, gB,t, dx,t, dy,t).
As before the only incentive we need to check is the case where expert is outside the
employer’s effective group. The payoff to employer mt ∈ gx,t from favoritism when expert
et /∈ gx,t, is:
1
2
l +
δ
1− δ
1
n(n− 1)
1
2
[2(gx,t − 1) + 2(n− gx,t)l + dx,t + dy,t] , (54)
By contrast, the payoff from offering the job to the expert et /∈ gx,t is:
1
2
+
δ
1− δ
1
n(n− 1)
1
2
[(n− 1) + dx,t + dy,t] (55)
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if gx,t > 2 and
1
2
+
δ
1− δ
1
n(n− 1)
1
2
[(n− 1) + dx,t + dy,t + 1] (56)
if gx,t = 2.
The incentive for favoritism turns out to be identical to the incentive at date t = 1.
Especially, it is lowest when the effective group is of size 2. Moreover, a respondent will
always accept an offer, as rejection lowers current payoffs and results in ostracism which
lowers future payoffs as well. To yield a subgame perfect equilibrium, the strategies must be
individually rational for any possible history of the game. Some histories lead to an effective
group of size 2, so δ must be greater than or equal to δ0(2). This condition is actually sufficient
since ∀g > 2, δ0(g) < δ0(2).
QED
Proof of Proposition 8: The key observation is that from a situation where everyone
practises market behavior, one pair of individuals does not have an incentive to deviate and
practice strong favoritism. To see this, observe that the individual payoff to practice strong
favoritism is this case is equal to
1
n(n− 1)[1 + l(n− 2)] (57)
This is much lower than the incentive to practice hiring favoritism in the same situation.
Here, an expert in the pair loses 1 every time the employer is not his partner. We can easily
see that this payoff is lower than the expected payoff of practising market behavior, 1
n
, as soon
as n ≥ 3. Under repeated interactions, this also means that deviating from strong favoritism
is individually rational for any value of δ. To complete the proof, observe that there exist
histories of the game leading to a pair of individuals practising strong favoritism and all others
practising market behavior both under ostracism and market reversion.
QED
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